The Beginnings of Consequentialism

In our early years, most of us intuitively adopt a consequentialist viewpoint. As children, we naturally gravitate toward states of being that we prefer—such as joy, security, and satisfaction—and assess others' actions as positive when they foster these conditions.

Conversely, we instinctively shy away from negative experiences—like suffering, anxiety, and deprivation—and judge actions as negative when they induce these feelings. If we possess any sense of integrity, we eventually come to understand that our actions can similarly impact others, leading us to critically evaluate our own missteps.

In our formative years, when we contemplate rules and virtues, we likely perceive them as tools. Rules exist to guide individuals toward actions with positive consequences or to deter harmful actions. Virtues are valued because their cultivation simplifies the process of doing good and complicates the temptation to act poorly.

Even as we mature and encounter philosophical thinkers like Aristotle and Kant—who champion virtue ethics and deontology, respectively—we may still find their moral frameworks less compelling than consequentialist philosophies such as utilitarianism.

This skepticism is understandable; we expect rules to be justified. Deontological theories often treat moral rules as self-evident. But what happens when we face conflicting rules? How do we determine which to follow if not by considering the good they lead to?

Moreover, consider the commendability of acting out of duty, regardless of the outcome. For example, is a person who begrudgingly helps the homeless out of obligation truly more admirable than someone who assists out of genuine empathy and a desire to bring happiness?

Similar critiques apply to virtue ethics. What grounds do we have for labeling certain traits as virtues and others as vices? Why should we commend a particular trait if not for the positive outcomes associated with it?

Again, if acting virtuously is inherently easier for virtuous individuals, shouldn't we celebrate those who resist wrongdoing instead?

A Refined Understanding of Consequentialism

You may find the last point unsettling, perhaps thinking that the virtuous person deserves more praise. After all, just as it is better to avoid driving under the influence than to successfully navigate home while intoxicated, it could be argued that the initial choice to cultivate a virtue is what truly deserves commendation.

This realization raises a significant challenge for consequentialism: if achieving positive outcomes consistently requires individuals to develop virtues, then the model is inherently flawed.

Deontologists might also weigh in, questioning why we must favor one set of rules over another. They may argue that demonstrating any set of rules is better than having none suffices. If adhering to rational rules better serves the common good than allowing individuals to calculate utility for each isolated action, then rules might, in fact, be more fundamental than consequences.

As a result, you may find yourself reassessing your commitment to consequentialism, potentially leaning more toward virtue ethics than deontology.

The challenge with making moral rules foundational is that they are often subject to interpretation. This isn't necessarily detrimental. Rigid rules, even when uniformly enforced, can lead to absurd outcomes that undermine the trust they are meant to uphold.

Conversely, ambiguous rules can be beneficial, provided we trust those interpreting and enforcing them to act virtuously. If individuals embody virtues such as honesty and integrity, then interpreting these ambiguous rules is more likely to yield positive results. However, if rules become ends in themselves, individuals may exploit ambiguity to further self-serving agendas, again eroding trust.

Still, if effective rules depend on virtuous individuals to create and enforce them, we are led back to the consequences of unanchored rules versus those rooted in virtue. This brings us full circle to a nuanced understanding of consequentialism, appreciating the roles of virtue and duty.

The Evolution of Consequentialism

Our faith in simplistic consequentialism was challenged by the realization that deontology and virtue ethics might be more consequentialist than traditional consequentialism itself. To achieve optimal outcomes, we may need to prioritize rules and virtues. By adopting these elements first, positive consequences may naturally follow; neglecting them could hinder our ability to foster good outcomes.

This raises the question: which rules and virtues should we prioritize?

Years ago, I explored Billions and Billions, the final work of astronomer Carl Sagan. In it, he examines morality through a scientific lens, drawing significantly from Robert Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation.

Intrigued, I delved into Axelrod's book and the works it references, uncovering a fascinating field of study surrounding human moral emotions. If virtues represent predispositions to align with specific values, it becomes evident that our virtues have evolved.

Moreover, it turns out that many social mammals exhibit moral behaviors akin to our own. However, we possess something they lack: established rules.

This observation led me to envision a framework in which social species develop emotional predispositions—virtues—facilitating cooperation. Each predisposition engenders expectations about behavior, compelling individuals to act a certain way while anticipating similar actions from others.

These expectations function as unwritten rules within a community. Only later, in societies that formalize rule-making, do these unwritten norms evolve into systems of law, subsequently analyzed by philosophers who seek to clarify inconsistencies and rationalize the authority of such rules.

By tracing this process back to its origins, we recognize that any moral system is subject to the same evolutionary principles governing other traits. Our rules stem from virtues, and our virtues are those that have persisted through evolutionary pressures.

Final Reflections

Evolutionary consequentialism prompts several profound inquiries, each worthy of its own exploration. I will briefly outline two here, with the intention of expanding upon them in future articles.

The first question pertains to the objectivity of evolved ethics. If by "objective," one means that our evolved virtues and rules hold intrinsic goodness, I must express skepticism. I find it challenging to grasp what that concept entails.

If morality is a natural phenomenon, then the relevance of moral virtues or rules within a supernatural or metaphysical context becomes negligible. If such a realm does not exist, it is inconsequential. If it does exist, we must interrogate how it could serve as a source for moral virtues and rules.

As we've discussed, these originate from an evolutionary process driven by survival amid various selection pressures. A timeless, transcendent realm lacks the dynamic changes, pressures, and trade-offs that characterize real-world evolution.

A more intellectually sound perspective on moral objectivity may be found in philosopher Daniel Dennett’s Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, where he discusses "forced moves" in evolutionary design. Just as a chess player must make a forced move to avoid checkmate, there may exist limited designs for large-brained, social animals.

It’s possible that our current moral virtues are not only the product of survival through evolution but also the only virtues capable of getting us to this point. If true, this would render our moral virtues as objective as possible within a materialistic framework.

However, it’s essential to note that this does not extend to any specific moral system. Our moral intuitions align with various cultural traditions, allowing for a diverse array of formal and informal laws shaped by our varied geographical and historical contexts.

This brings us to a second intriguing question raised by evolutionary consequentialism: how do we choose between different rules or sets of rules?

Evolution typically favors "satisficing" solutions, as political scientist Herbert Simon described. An adaptation need not be optimal; it just needs to be better than available alternatives. However, when humans establish societal rules, we generally aspire to higher standards, seeking not just survival but flourishing.

This suggests a potential rationale for revolutions. Just as our scientific comprehension evolves, our moral understanding may also require paradigm shifts.

Conversely, evolutionary processes tend to be conservative. Major changes are often detrimental, and revolutions can blur the lines between beneficial and harmful policies. From an evolutionary consequentialist viewpoint, the process of selecting rules should be transparent, inclusive, and incremental, informed by a profound understanding of our historical context.

Ultimately, if evolutionary consequentialism offers any certainty, it likely pertains more to the clarification of our ethical concepts than to the content of those concepts themselves. This implies that there may be no definitive code of moral rules or immutable natural law.

As long as we continue to exist and evolve, so too will our understanding of right and wrong. The driving force behind this evolution will always be human well-being.